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IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through , .. 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respoudent, 
· Case No. 
vs. \) 11388 
THOMAS V. 'V"ILLIAMS and 
JO ANN H. WILLIAMS, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a highway condemnation action brought 
by the plaintiff against defendants whereby certain lands 
were acquired from the latter along the east side of 
Highway 89 extending between Salt Lake City and 
Ogden. The precise area involved is in Davis County, 
along what is often ref erred to as the "Mountain 
Road." The sole issue before this Court is that of 
1 
whether defendants can recover damages sustained by 
their contiguous remaining properties by reason of 
the loss of lands taken and the construction of the 
highway project in the manner contemplated. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The damage issue in this matter was tried by Hon. 
Parley E. Norseth, District Judge, sitting without a 
jury. Judgment was granted in favor of defendants 
and against plaintiff in the total amount of $3,950.00. 
Defendants thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial 
seeking to have the Judgment increased to an amount 
more nearly in line with the testimony of defendants' 
expert witness and the holding by the Court that de-
fendants had: sustained their burden of proof in the 
matter. The Motion for New Trial was denied and, at 
the same time, Judge Norseth entered a complete ruling 
in the matter in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Denying New Trial (R. 27). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have the Judgment modified 
by the addition of the sum of $3,896.00. Also, defendants 
urgently seek a clear-cut ruling on the point of law 
involved inasmuch as it substantially affects many con· 
demnation cases in Utah, which are presently in litga· 
tion and which will be filed in many pending acquisi-
tions. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff condemned certain properties of the 
defendants for the purpose of widening and improving 
Highway 89 along the ":Mountain Road" area of Davis 
County between Cherry Lane and the Uintah Junction 
at the mouth of Weber Canyon. In so doing it was 
necessary to acquire from defendants a strip of land 
37 feet wide extending across the front, or west, end 
of their property. Also, direct access was taken from 
Highway 89 and a fence was constructed across the 
front of their residence. Substitute access was provided 
via a frontage road extending south from defendants' 
property to a new entry to Highway 89 constructed for 
defendants and several other property owners in the 
area. At the time of trial the construction was com-
pleted and the enlarged highway had been in operation 
for some time. 
The properties of defendants consisted of a duplex 
residence and .43 acre of land prior to the taking (R. 
4, and see Parcel 94:A of Exhibit A-2 attached to the 
Complaint). The Trial Court heard the matter without 
a jury. The Court's Findings of Fact determined that 
the tract of land and residence located thereon had a fair 
market value immediately prior to the condemnation 
of $28,000.00 (R. 28). It was further found that by 
reason of the taking and the manner and nature of the 
construction of the highway the remaining properties 
not taken sustained a total diminution in their fair mar-
ket value of $7 ,096.00 as their measure of damages. 
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The Court further found (R. 28) that the remain-
ing properties could be substantially restored in use 
to their former value and utility by applying the "cost 
of cure" approach to damages, which was reflected in 
the foregoing "before" and "after" value difference 
of $7 ,096.00. 
The expert appraiser for plaintiff, Memory Cain 
(who was also the State appraiser in the case of State 
Road Commission v. Stanger- recently before this 
Court) , found no proximity damages to the remainder 
property since he felt that such damages were not 
unique, unusual or special to defendants' remaining 
properties as compared to other properties in the general 
vicinity which he contended were similarly affected by 
reason of the proximity of the newly constructed high-
way (R. 21-23). 
In his Findings of Fact and in his Minute Entry 
( R. 15) the Court specifically ruled that defendants 
had sustained their burden of proof as to the damage 
claimed, and specifically found that the proximity dam-
age to the remaining properties resulting from sub· 
stantial noise amounted to $3,896.00. The Court adopted 
the "cost of cure" approach which would pay the cost 
of " . . . thermopane windows along the front portion 
of the home and a limited degree of air conditioning 
for summertime use to facilitate sleeping conditions in 
the home" (R. 29). The remainder of the diminution 
in value, representing the difference between $3,896.00 
and $7,096.00-or $3,200.00-was included in and made 
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a part of the Judgment. However, the Court also found 
that the proximity damages suffered by defendants' 
property were not "special, unique and peculiar to their 
property inasmuch as other properties in th4 genera: 
area . . . " had sustained similar damages. The Court 
then ruled as a Conclusion of Law that this proximity 
damage, even though existing and measurable, was not 
compensable as a matter of law (R. 30). 
In his ruling Judge Norseth, being completely ad-
vised of the legal issue involved in a letter sent by the 
writers ( R. 24, 25), signed the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order Denying New Trial. In 
so doing he made all of the necessary findings and legal 
rulings essential to this appeal so that the single issue 
would be certified without any necessity for a new trial 
notwithstanding how this Court should rule on the issue 
involved. Consequently, upon the determination of this 
appeal the Judgment should either be affirmed or, in 
the alternative, modified to add $3,896.00 thereto. 
Judge Norseth kindly framed the issue to this 
Court in order that a decision could be made on a critical 
point of condemnation law. Although appellants have 
firmly believed the matter was completley resolved in 
Utah in the case of Board of Education of Logan City 
v. Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962), there has 
Hot appeared to be a clear understanding of this area 
of the law on the part of Utah lawyers and judges. 
Except for this one ruling of Judge Norseth and sev-
eral rulings of Judge Wahlquist contrary to the position 
5 
taken by appellants in this appeal, the other judges 
in Utah before whom this issue had arisen in cases where 
these writers have been involved have adopted the posi-
tion of the defendants. In fact, there is now pending 
an appeal to this Court in the case of State of Utah, by 
and through its Road Commission v. Hoenes (N6:':.5.~ 
a jury trial presided over by Judge Faux, where the 
same issues arose. Judge Faux adopted the position 
being advanced by defendants in this brief. 
In view of the importance of this issue in many 
eminent domain cases being tried in Utah, it is earnestly 
hoped that the issue will be clearly decided in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN EMINENT 
DOMAIN CASES DO NOT HA VE TO BE SPE-
CIAL, PECULIAR, OR UNIQUE TO THE RE-
MAINING PROPERTY NOT TAKEN - AS 
COMPARED TO DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY 
OTHER PROPERTIES IN THE GENERAL 
AREA-IN ORDER TO BE COMPENSABLE. 
Critical to any analysis of the law of eminent 
domain is the wording of the constitutional and statu· 
tory provisions of the law of the State involved. Our 
pertinent Utah statutory provision is contained in Sec-
tion 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The sub· 
sections relating to the allowable items of compensation 
(with the writer's statement under each indicating the 
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type of compensation or damage classification attribut-
able thereto) are ~et out as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The value of the property sought to be con-
demned and all improvements thereon ap-
pertaming to the realty, and of each and 
every separate estate or interest therein; 
and if it consists of different parcels, the 
value of each parcel and of each estate or 
interest therein shall be separately assessed. 
(This is compensation for the TAKING) 
If the property sought to be condemned con-
stitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion 
not ~ought to be condemned by reason of 
its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction ot the im-
provement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff. 
(This is SE VE RAN CE damage) 
If the property, though no part thereof is 
taken, will be damaged by the construction 
of the proposed improvement ,the amount 
of such damages. 
(This is CONSEQUENTIAL damage) 
There can be no dispute that this case is properly 
classified as a partial-taking or "severance" case. As 
such the measure of damages is prescribed by subsection 
(2) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-34-10. 
This classification under subsection (2) as a partial-
taking case is of considerable significance to a resolution 
of the issue here presented. More particularly, the 
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distinction between a partial-taking case (subsection 2) 
and a no-taking case (subsection 3) is important to a 
re.solution of the issue here presented. 
Contrary to the rule allowing severance damage 
in partial-taking cases, the concept allowing compen-
sation in no-taking cases was not firmly established 
until comparatively recent times. The rule which denied 
compensation in no-taking cases was not invoked with 
sufficient frequency to cause its justice to be seriously 
questioned. The rapid growth of this country during 
the early part of the 19th century caused an awareness 
of the inequities in the existing rule which precluded 
compensation in no-taking cases. 2 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain, Section 6.4. 
Liberalization of the harsh rule denying compensa-
tion in no-taking cases had its genesis in England and 
in the State of .Massachusetts. In both of these juris-
dictions there eventually evolved a concept which, in 
varying terms, denied compensation to a landowner, 
no part of whose property had been taken, where the 
injury was found to have been suffered in general with 
other property owners in the area. 2 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain, Sections 6.41, 6.42 and 6.43. 
The liberalization in England and Massachusetts 
was accomplished without the aid of a constitutional 
directive. It was not until 1870 that the first state, 
Illinois, adopted a constitutional provision requiring 
that private property should be neither taken nor 
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da11utged for public use without compensation. 2 Nich-
ols, Eminent Domain, Section 6.44. 
From a superficial consideration the most natural 
interpretation of these constitutional provisions would 
have been to extend the existing right to recover ~ever­
ance damage in partial-taking cases to those cases 
where no property was taken. This would have allowed 
compensation in no-taking cases for damage suffered 
in common with property owners in the general area. 
However, in most jurisdictions such a definition of 
damages has been rejected as too broad and the limita-
tion has been imposed requiring special and unique 
damage in the no-taking case. Three reasons for this 
rejection of a broad construction of the damage provi-
sion in state constitutions have been given by Nichols 
in his work on eminent domain. 
(a) Multiplicity of claims. 
(b) Discrimination against the public sector and 
in favor of the private sector. 
( c) The meaning earlier given by England and 
Massachusetts to the word "damage" was pre-
sumed to have been intended. 
2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 6.441 (1) 
The na~ower interpretation given the word "dam-
age" as it applies to no-taking cases is, in its practical 
working, much the same as the Massachusetts principle 
which requires the physical disturbance of a right which 
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results in a special damage to property in excess of that 
sustained by the public generally. The definition was 
initially evolved in Illinois and has since been adopted 
in almost all of the states. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 
Section 6.441 (3). 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the lead of 
Illinois and has refused to treat the word "damage' 
in Article I, Section 22, of the Constitution of Utah 
as an extension of the existing right to recover for 
damage to remaining land when part of a tract is taken 
to cases where no property is taken. Instead, the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the more restrictive rule, as 
first applied in Illinois, which requires that damage to 
a tract no part of which is taken must be special, pe-
culiar or unique and not such as is suffered in common 
with the general public. Jordan v. Utah Ry. Co., 47 
Utah 519, 156 Pac. 939 (1916); Twenty-Second Car· 
poration v. Oregon, etc. R. R. Co., 36 Utah 238, 103 
Pac. 243 ( 1909) ; Stockdale v. Rio Grande R. Co., 28 
Utah 207, 77 Pac. 849 (1904); Springville Banking 
Co. v. Burton, IO Utah 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960). 
The distinction between partial-taking cases and 
no-taking cases, as originated by the decision not to 
extend to the no-taking cases the same broad interpre· 
tation as existed in the partial-taking cases, has been 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. In fact, the 
Utah Supreme Court, in explaining this difference in 
the case of Board of Education of Logan City School 
District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962). 
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made a footnote reference to 2 Nichols, Eminent Do-
main, Section 6.441 ( 1), (previously cited), where the 
historical development of the distinction is discussed. 
Likewise, in the very recent case of Hampton v. State 
nf Utah by and through its Road Commission,--·· Utah 
2d .... , 445 P.2d 708 (1968), it was said: 
"It should be observed that this court has de-
veloped a procedural distinction between a "tak-
ing" and "damage," for the landowner has been 
denied recovery in a situation involving the lia-
bility of a highway authority for consequential 
damage." 
As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized the distinction between partial-taking cases 
and no-taking cases in Board of Education of Logan 
City School Di:strict v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 
697 ( 1962) . That case involved the taking for school 
grounds purposes of a portion of the property owned 
by Croft. The jury verdict awarded compensation 
under all three subsections of Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, Section 78-34-10. This Court, realizing the irregu-
larity, was obliged to clearly distinguish between sub-
section 2 (partial-taking) and subsection 3 (no-taking). 
This the Court did on page 699 in the following lan-
guage: 
"Damage to land, by the construction of a 
public or industrial improvement, though no part 
thereof is taken as provided for under 78-34-10 
( 3), contrary to the rule for severance da_mages, 
is limited to injuries that would be actionable 
at common law, or where there has been some 
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physical disturbance of a right, either public or 
private, which the owner enjoys in connection 
with his property and which gives it additional 
value, and which causes him to sustain a special 
damage with respect to his property in excess of 
that sustained by the public generally. It requires 
a definite physical injury cognizable to the senses 
with a perceptible effect on the present market 
value: such as drying up wells and springs, de· 
stroying lateral support, preventing surface 
waters from running off adjacent lands or run-
nig surface waters onto adjacent lands, or the 
depositing of cinders and other foreign materials 
on neighboring lands by the permanent opera· 
tion of the business or improvement established 
on the adjoining lands." (Italics added). 
The foregoing quotation explains the need for a 
showing that the damage is special and unique only in 
those cases which fall under subsection ( 3), i.e., those 
cases where property is damaged though no part thereof 
is taken. Other courts which have squarely faced the 
issue have similarly resolved it. 
In South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Touch· 
berry, 248 S.C. 1, 148 S. E. 2d 747 (1966), the state 
took 20.5 acres of a 146 acre farm. The state appealed 
on the basis that the trial court had erred in submitting 
to the jury for its consideration four factors as elements 
of damage: (1) increased traffic noise at the landown· 
er' s residence, ( 2) loss of breeze, ( 3) loss of view, and 
( 4) circuity of travel. The state contended that in·. 
creased traffic noise resulting from the construction of 
the highway near the Touchberry residence did not con· 
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stitutc special damage because there was no showing 
that the alleged injury was special and peculiar to the 
landowner and not such as was commonly suffered by 
all others whose homes were in close proximity to the 
highway. The Court responded to this contention in 
the manner found on page 7 48: 
"This contention is apparently based upon a 
misconception of the law applicable in assessing 
damages to the remaining property of a land-
owner where a portion of an entire tract has 
been condemned for a public improvement. We 
quote from 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
Section 14.1, page 473: "A distinction must be 
drawn between consequential damages to a re-
mainder area where part of a tract is physically 
appropriated and consequential damages to a 
tract no part of which is physically appropriated. 
In the latter case the damage must be peculiar 
to such land and not be such as is suffered in 
common with the general public. In the former 
case it matters not that the injury i,s suffered in 
common with the general public." (Ialics added) 
In the above quotation the South Carolina Supreme 
Court referred to a "misconception of the law." That 
a "misconception of the law" does exist is evidenced 
by several partial-taking cases where there has been 
imposed the requirement that damages to the remainder 
be special, peculiar and unique and not such as are 
shared in common with the general public. However, all 
cases found by these writers which directly and squarely 
face the issue by recognizing and discussing the dis-
tinction between a partial-taking situation and a no-
13 
taking situation have resolved the issue as did the South 
Carolina Supreme Court in the Touchberry case. 
In State Highway Commission v. Bloom, 77 S.D. 
452, 93 N.W. 2d 572, 77 A.L.R. 2d 533 ( 1958), the 
state took 51.6 acres of a large cattle ranch. In discuss-
ing severance damages the Court distinguished partial. 
taking cases from no-taking cases and, in regard to the 
partial-taking cases, stated on page 577: 
"But where a part of an owner's parcel or 
tract of land is taken for a public improvement , 
such as a public highway the owner is entitled 
to be compensated for the part taken and for 
consequential damage to the part not taken even 
though the consequential damage is of a kind 
suffered by the public in common. (citing author· 
ity) ." (Italics added). 
City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69 
N. W. 2d 909, 912 (1955), involved a partial taking 
from each of three tracts for construction of a new 
sewage treatment plant; the cases involving the three 
separate tracts being consolidated for trial. The trial 
court ruled that reduction in market value due to prox· 
imity was not a compensable factor. In respect to tract 
"B" the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. 
"At the outset, it might be well to examine 
a few of the basic rules governing the compensa· 
bility of so-called "consequential" damage, 
Where no part of a owner's land is taken but, 
because of the taking and use of adjoining prop· 
erty, damage is caused to an owner's land, the 
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damage is not compensable unless the conse-
quential injury is peculiar to the adjoining 
owner's property and not of a type suffered by 
the public as a whole. (citing authority) . How-
ever, in cases where there is a partial taking, the 
injured owner is not required to show that the 
injury is peculiar to his remaining property. It 
is sufficient that the damage is shown to have 
been caused by the taking of part of his prop-
erty even though it is damage of a type suffered 
by the public as a whole. (citing authority). This 
is true even where the claimed damage to the 
remaining property is due to the use to which 
the property taken will be devoted by the taker. ,, 
Authorities on the law of eminent domain have 
considered the issue at hand and have stated their find-
ings as consistent with the Logan, Touchberry, Bloom 
and Crookston cases. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Sec-
tions 6.44 32 ( 2) and 6.45; 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 
Sections 14.1 and 14.4; 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Do-
main, Section 310 ( 1966). 
"Where part of a parcel of land is taken by 
eminent domain, the owner is not restricted to 
compensation for the land actually taken; he is 
also entitled to recover for the damage to his 
remaining land. In other words, he is entitled 
to full compensation for the taking of his land 
and all its consequences, and th~ right to recover 
for the damage to his remaining land is not 
based upon the theory that damage to such land 
constitutes a taking of it, nor is there any re-
quirement that the damage be special and pecu-
15 
liar, or such as would be actionable at common 
law; it is enough that it is a consequently of the 
taking ... " (Italics added). 
27 Am. J ur. 2d, Eminent Domain, Section 310 
(1966) 
There is a distinction, however, to be noted 
between the assessment of compensation in the 
case of a taking and in the case of a damage 
when no land is taken. In the former case the 
mere fact that there has been a taking entitles 
the owner to recover for all damage~ to his re· 
maining land, whether special or shared by the 
public generally, provided they flow from the 
taking, since he is constitutionally entitled to be 
made whole for all injuries resulting from the 
taking of his land; but when there is no taking 
he is entitled only to such damages as the con-
stitution or statutes provide, and as the dam-
ages usually provided for are held to be only 
those which are special and peculiar, the mere 
fact that an owner is entitled to recover such 
damages is no ground for allowing damages of 
a different character, although resulting from 
the construction of the same work. ... " (Italics 
added). 
2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 6.45. 
The last three quotations have mentioned a limi· 
tation upon the general rule that severance damage 
is to be determined by the difference in fair market 
value of the remaining land before and after the partial 
taking. The limitation there referred to is one commonly 
encountered in the practice of law; it can be stated in 
16 
rarious ways: Severance damage must be a conse-
quence of the taking; it must fiow from the taking, 
and it must be caused by the taking and use of adjoining 
property. 
It is this pervasive requirement of causation which 
has confused the issue of this appeal and created those 
"misconception of the law" to which reference has pre-
viously been made. The requirement that severance 
damage be tied causally with the partial taking and the 
rule that damage in no-taking cases be special, peculiar 
and unique are such that the two can be easily confused. 
The two rules are definitely related. 
If a landowner, part of whose parcel has been 
taken, suffers a diminution in the fair market value of 
his remaining tract under circumstances where the 
damage cannot be causally tied to the partial taking, 
then the landowner has suffered a damage which is 
common to the neighborhood and noncompensable, at 
least as to himself. This is so for the reason that the 
damage must arise from some other point in the neigh-
borhood if it does not arise from a partial taking of 
the land in question. However, the reverse does not 
follow. If all persons in a neighborhood suffer a similar 
diminution in the market values of their properties, 
it does not follow that all will be deprived of just com-
pensation on the basis that none can make the causal 
link. Any one or more of these persons suffering a 
similar loss is entitled to compensation if he can show 
that his loss is a consequence of the partial taking of 
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his own property. Thus, when a landowner has been 
unable to show the causal relation between his damage 
and a partial taking of his property, the courts have 
justifiably said that, as to the particular landowner, 
the damage was noncompensable and such as was suf· 
fered in general in the neighborhood. However, the 
courts have not justifiably said that the damage was' 
noncompensable because it was shared in common with 
the public as a whole. The damage would be noncom· 
pensable because it did not arise as a consequence of 
the partial taking and not because it lacked the qualities, 
of uniqueness and peculiarity and was suffered in com· 
mon with others in the neighborhood. 
This precise confusion on the part of a trial judge 
was described as "unfortunate" in the yery recent case 
of State of Utah by and through its Road Commis.yion, 
v. Stanger, (No. 11028) .... Utah 2d .... , 442 P.2d 941 
( 1968). Although appellant attempted to bring this 
same issue before this Court in the Stanger case, the 
issue was avoided and the decision was handed down 
on other grounds. Further analysis of the issue before ' 
the Court in this case, together with allied matters, are 
set forth in Appellants' Brief in that case. That Brief 
is also being recommended to this Court as further 
argument and supporting authority by the defendan!I 
in this appeal. 
In the case now before the Court the trial judge 
made an express finding that the damage to the remain· 
ing property from increased noise resulted as a conse 
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queuce of the taking and use of the 37 foot wide strip 
in front of the Williams' home. This 37 foot wide strip 
of land was used by the condemnor for the purpose of 
widening the existing roadway from two to four lanes. 
The widened road was actually constructed upon land 
taken from the appellants. The words of the trial judge 
are contained in paragraph number 9 of the Findings 
of Fact (R. 29) : 
''Due to the widening of the previously exist-
ing highway, the traveled portion of the newly 
constructed highway is considerably c\oser to 
the residence of the defendants than before; 
and such closer proximity has resulted and will 
result, .jp. a substantially greater problem from 
traffic noise which has reduced the value of the 
remaining properties by reason of such condition. ,, 
The rule limiting severance damages to those 
arising as a consequence of the taking will off er the 
condemning agency sufficient protection from a multi-
plicity of claims. The fear that a multiplicity of claims 
might render the construction of public improvements 
so inordinately expensive as to materially retard develop-
ment in the public sector has often been expressed as a 
reason for imposing limitations upon recovery in con-
demnation cases. This policy reason for restricting 
recovery is adequately satisfied by the causation require-
ment. The causation requirement insures that the con-
demning agency must pay for only those severance 
damages which arise from its own taking of adjoining 
land. In fact, this policy consideration has little appli-
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cation to the partial-taking cases where the state, a5 
plaintiff, is in court on its own initiative. 
Another policy reason of ten given for limiting the 
recovery in condemnation cases, is that a broad defini-
tion of "damage" creates an unjust and arbitrary 
discriminatlion against public improvements and in 
favor of private improvements and in favor of those 
damaged by the former and against those damaged by 
the latter. Again, this policy consideration is inapplic-
able in partial-taking cases, but finds its application as 
a consideration against recovery in no-taking cases. 
The private sector, not having the power of eminent 
domain, is never involved in a partial-taking situation. 
The causation requirement insures that the condemnor 
is required to pay for only that severance damage which 
is attributable to a partial taking. 
The trial judge in this case, in paragraph number 
6 of the Fiudings of Fact (R. 28), made an express 
finding that the Williams' remaining properties had 
sustained a total diminution in fair market value of 
$7,096.00, and that this damage resulted from the loss 
of the land mken. However, in his Conclusions of Law 
( R. 29 and 30) the trial judge deviated from the before 
and after rule by denying compensation to the land· 
owners for a portion of the damage which they had 
suffered as a consequence of the closer proximity of 
the roadway. The trial judge allowed as just compen· 
sation the sum of $3,200.00, and not the greater su!ll 
of $7 ,096.00 which he expressly found to be the differ· 
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ence between the before and after values as expressed 
by the market. 
This Court has many times expressed its acceptance 
of the rule allowing severance damages to the extent 
of the difference in market values of the remaining tract 
before and after condemnation. More specifically, this 
Court has adopted such an approach as it relates to 
proximity damages arising from the condemnation of 
a strip adjacent to a resident. In State v. Ward, 112 
Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113 (1948), the Utah State Road 
Commission widened a road in such a manner as to 
increase the proximity of defendant's home to the road-
way by 35 feet. This Court clearly recognized the 
proximity damages and affirmed the award of severance 
damage in the amount of $3,000.00. The court spoke 
of ten of proximity damages, of their effect upon market 
value and of their compensability under the before and 
after formula. 
Other jurisdictions have recognized the effect upon 
a residence of its proximity to a roadway and have been 
willing to compensate for the diminution in value as 
expressed by the market. State through Di:p't of High-
tPJays v. Bourg, 135 So. 2d 600 (Ct. App. La. 1961); 
State Department of Highways v. Leger, 170 So. 2d 
399 (Ct. App. La. 1965); Commonwealth, Department 
of Highways v. Elizabeth Amusements Incorporated, 
367 S.\V. 2d 449 (Ct. App. Ky. 1963). All three of the 
cited cases involved the taking of a narrow strip for 
widening of an existing roadway. In the Elizabethtown 
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case, at page 452, the court affirmed the landowner'1 
position as follows: 
"We believe that a diminution in value of the 
rem3:in~ng land _of a condemnee resulting from 
proxmuty of a highway may be considered as a!i 
element of condemnation damages the same as a 
diminution in value resulting from proximity of 
a railroad, (citing authority) , or a gas pipe line, 
(citing authority), or an electric transmission 
line, (citing authority). In any situation the mr 
to which the condemned property will be put 
necessarily will have some bearing on the exist-
ence and extent of damage to the remaining lano 
of the condemnee. A common example would 
be a reduction in value of residential property 
resulting from the highway's being brought in 
close proximity to the dwelling." 
The Utah Supreme Court and other appellate 
courts have looked at proximity damages with addi-
tional specificity and have held that noise may be taken 
into consideration by the trier of the facts in awarding 
severance damages. Depreciation in value of a remain· 
ing parcel as a consequence of the taking and attribut· 
able to traffic noise is compensable. State Road Com· 
mission v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P. 2d 552 
(1962); Zaremba v. State, 29 App. Div. 2d 773, 286 
N.Y.S. 2d 379 (1968); Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
Department of Highways v. Burns, 399 S.W. 2d 923 
(Ct. App. Ky. 1965); South Carolina State High· 
way Dep't. v. Touchberry, 248 S. C. l, 148 S. E. 2d 
747 (1966); State Highway Department v. Auyusfrr 
District of North Georgia Conference of the Methodi.il 
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Church, 115 Ga. App. 162, 154 S. E. 2d 29 (1967). 
Noise is unquestionably a matter which a willing buyer 
in the open market would consider in determining the 
price he would pay for any given piece of real prop-
erty. Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 68 Cal. Rptr. 235 
(Ct. App. 1968) . 
In State Road Commission v. Christensen, 13 
Utah 2d 224, 371 P. 2d 552, 554 (1962), this Court 
entertained an appeal by the State Road Commission 
from an award of $5,500.00 for taking and severance. 
Iu affirming the district court, this Court ref erred to 
the landowner's claim " ... to have suffered damage 
by the heavy traffic and loud noises from the through 
highway being built." As to this and other claims this 
Court stated " ... that there was ample evidence to 
support the amount of severance damages awarded 
In State Highway Department v. Augusta District 
of North Georgia Conference of the Methodist Church, 
115 Ga. App. 162, 154 S.E. Sd 29, 30 (1967), the 
condemnee was left with remaining property improved 
by four cabins which were in close proximity to the 
newly constructed highway. The Georgia State High-
way Department challenged an award of severance 
damages. To this challenge the appellate court respond-
ed as follows: 
"If shown to affect adversely the value and 
use of the condemnee's remaining property, evi-
dence of noise and other elements may be taken 
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into consid.eration by the _j~ry in determining 
consequential damages. ( c1tmg authority)." 
The case of South Carolina State Highway Dep't. 
v. 'l.'o'Uchberry, 248 S.C. 1, 148 S. E. 2d 747 (1966), 
was previously cited for the propo~ition that damage~ 
to a remainder area where part of a tract is physically 
appropriated need not be special, unique or peculiar 
but may be suffered in common with the general 
public. That case, as part of its holding, allowed com. 
pensation for damage from increased traffic noise 
against the state's contention that the increased traffic 
noise near the Touchberry residence was not special 
but was suffered by all others whose homes were in close 
proximity to the highway. 
The severance damage which can be caused by 
noise and vibration is well demonstrated in the overhead 
flight cases which have arisen near the nation's airports. 
N oi~e and vibration have been considered as so sub· 
stantial as to amount to a taking of private property. 
These cases consider noise and vibration as factors 
which limit the utility of the land and cause a diminu· 
tion in its value. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 
256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 ( 1946); Thornburg 
v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P. 2d 100 ( 1962). 
In the instant case the appraiser for appellants 
adopted what has been termed a "cost of cure" approach 
to the determination of damages. The trial judge in 
paragraph number 7 of the Findings of Fact (R. 28) 
specifically found that the nature of the damages in 
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the case reasonably justified such an approach inasmuch 
as an expenditure of funds would permit a restoration 
in use of the properties to substantially their former 
condition. This "cost of cure" approach was relied upon 
in determining the total amount of severance damages, 
both those ruled compensable and those ruled noncom-
pensable. The introduction to Findings of Fact recites 
that the appellants sustained their burden of proof as 
to all items of damage claimed (R. 27). 
The Utah Supreme Court, as well as other courts, 
has expressed its app~oval of the "cost of cure" or 
restoration approach " ... when such restoration costs 
accurately measure the decrease in the market value of 
the property damaged but not taken ... " State v. 
Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113, 117 ( 1948). The 
Ward case properly required restoration costs to serve 
as a measure of the diminution in value. Restoration 
costs were disallowed in that case because they greatly 
exceeded the diminution in market value. 
In the instant case paragraph number 6 of Find-
ings of Fact ( R. 28) specifically recites that the differ-
ence between the before and after values of the remain-
ing property is $7,096.00. A summation of the two 
"cost of cure" items as contained in paragraphs number 
8 and 9 of Findings of Fact (R. 28 and 29) totals 
$7,096.00, and represents a method whereby damage 
to the remainder is mitigated by applying a cure. 
The application of the restoration or "cost of cure" 
approach to severance damage attributable to n01se, 
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while being seldom practical, is not unique to this case 
Such a mea1mre of damage attributable to noise receiveri 
the express approval of the appellate court in Stair 
Highway Departrnent v. Augusta District of Nori!: 
Georgia Conference of the Methodist Church, 115 Ga 
App. 162, 154 S.E. 2d 29 ( 1967). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge in this case recognized the diminutioL 
in market value to the appellants' remaining proper~ 
as a consequence of the land taken and the manner ana 
nature of the construction of the public improvemem 
( R. 28) . A portion of this diminution in value wru 
attributed to increased traffic noise ( R. 29). Suen 
amount attributable to increased traffic noise was helo 
to be noncompensable as a matter of law because othei 
persons in the neighborhood were similarly darnagel 
(R.ao). 
Since appellants have suffered proximity damagt 
as a consequence of the taking and the future use ol 
their own property, the Utah Constitution and the spirit 
of justice demands compensation. To deny this com 
pensation on the basis that some neighbors might have 
suffered the same injury-and without even knowin~ 
whether any or all of them might or might not be i11 
court under similar circumstances-would be to invokr 
a harsh and unfair requirement which is foreign to th1 
common law. Such a requirement has no place in' 
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)t. partial-taking or "severance" case. The requirement 
eri arose from no-taking cases, has historically been limited 
tl1 to those cases, and should continually be restricted to 
·in no-taking cases, where it possibly performs a function. 
I 
ra 
So long as severance damages flow from the taking 
of a portion of appellants' land, the State should not 
be heard to complain that the cost of "just compen-
sation" is so inordinately expensive as to retard improve-
ments. Such a complaint might be appropriate in a no-
taking case where the State is not in court, but where 
r~ the State is in court on its own volition, it should com-
pensate for the consequences of its acts. 
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There is another very practical reason why a prop-
erty owner's compensable severance damages should not 
be limited to those which are special, unique and peculiar. 
Trials involved with the issue of whether or not damages 
are suffered in common with others in the general area 
would degenerate into a neighborhood "witch hunt" to 
find someone with a similar problem arising from road 
building or similar activity. In a great many trials the 
complete neighborhood or town would literally be on 
trial and the resulting dispute arising from a comparison 
of damages to remaining properties could of ten dwarf 
the issue of determining just compensation for the 
unfortunate litigant having his property taken against 
his will. Damage to neighboring properties would have 
to be measured against that to property directly in-
volved in the lawsuit and the degree of similarity of 
damage would further complicate the whole picture. 
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And appraisers would be obliged to investigate ai 
neighboring properties and make numerous comparisoni 
while testifying, resulting in added expense, the con· 
sumption of time, and the likelihood of prejudice to 
the property owner. 
The Judgment should be modified and the law 
should be clearly set forth consistent with the position 
advanced by appellants in this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER and 
ORV AL C. HARRISON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
15 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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